Friday, October 20, 2023 - Federal Bar Association's 20th Annual Bankruptcy Ethics Symposium

October 20, 2023
Time: 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.
In Person & Remote | Three Programs
4 Hours Ethics MCLE (CA)

Click Here to Register Online

SPEAKERS

  • Honorable Barry Russell, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Central District of California

  • Honorable Meredith Jury (Ret.), U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Central District of California

  • J. Scott Bovitz, Bovitz & Spitzer

  • Stella Havkin, Havkin & Shrago

  • Brandon Iskander, Goe Forsythe & Hodges LLP

  • Jeffrey A. Koncius, Kiesel Law LLP

  • Kristin Mihelic, Counsel for the U.S. Government

  • Program Chair: Joseph Boufadel, Salvato Boufadel LLP

PROGRAMS

  1. Ethical Issues in the Use of AI in Your Bankruptcy Practice: Not the Fresh Start You Were Hoping For

  2. Missing Money, Mistakes, and Meanderings — Recent Attorney Misconduct

  3. Rule of Professional Conduct 8.3: Challenges and Questions

MCLE: 4.0 Hours Legal Ethics. This activity has been approved for Minimum Continuing Legal Education Credit by the State Bar of California. The FBA certifies that this activity conforms to the standards of approved education activities prescribed by the rules and regulations of the State Bar of California governing minimum continuing legal education.

Cost: (1) FBA members $25; (2) CDCBAA, LABF & CLA - Insolvency Law Committee members $35; (3) Non-Members & At-Door $50; (4) Judges and Clerks - Complimentary

Win: Court of Appeal affirms denial of anti-SLAPP motion. Defendant's prelitigation communication is not protected speech.

Helix Media LLC v. Natalie Clark et al., California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Appeal No. B315990 (November 17, 2022)

Salvato Boufadel successfully defended an appeal of the trial court's order denying the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that the defendants' prelitigation communication was not protected activity and was not protected by the litigation privilege.

Natalie Clark (Clark) and Freya Holdings LLC (Freya) appeal from an order denying their special motion to strike the operative complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. We conclude Clark did not meet her burden of demonstrating the conduct forming the basis of the underlying complaint involved protected activity within the meaning of section 425.16. Accordingly, we affirm. reversed a $3,200,000 default judgment entered more than seven years earlier that was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal in a published decision. ***

We conclude the evidence in the record does not establish Clark imminently intended to commence litigation against Helix for its alleged breach of contracts with the Merchant LLCs (she never did), or that Helix was seriously contemplating suing Clark at the time she sent the January 28 email. At most, the record established Clark anticipated a potential for litigation. Thus, Clark failed to meet her threshold burden to show her conduct fell within the ambit of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). The trial court, therefore, properly denied Clark’s special motion to strike.

Friday, November 18, 2022 - Federal Bar Association's 19th Annual Bankruptcy Ethics Symposium

November 18, 2022
Time: 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.
In Person | Three Programs
4 Hours Ethics MCLE (CA)

Click Here to Register Online
Click Here for Flyer (PDF)

SPEAKERS

  • Honorable Julia W. Brand, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Central District of California

  • Honorable Barry Russell, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Central District of California

  • J. Scott Bovitz, Bovitz & Spitzer

  • David M. Goodrich, Golden Goodrich LLP

  • Thomas Plunkett, Managing Director of Digital Forensics at ArcherHall

  • Program Chair: Joseph Boufadel, Salvato Boufadel LLP

PROGRAMS

  1. Common Ethical Issues for Bankruptcy Lawyers

  2. Lawyer Louses: The Bad and ‘Baddest’ Moments from 2022

  3. Attorney Ethics and Electronically Stored Information and Admissibility and Use of Digital Evidence at Trial

MCLE: 4.0 Hours Legal Ethics. This activity has been approved for Minimum Continuing Legal Education Credit by the State Bar of California. The FBA certifies that this activity conforms to the standards of approved education activities prescribed by the rules and regulations of the State Bar of California governing minimum continuing legal education.

Cost: (1) FBA members $25; (2) CDCBAA, LABF & CLA - Insolvency Law Committee members $35; (3) Non-Members & At-Door $50; (4) Judges and Clerks - Complimentary

ILC E-Bulletin: In re Harang, 634 B.R. 731 (6th Cir. BAP 2021) - FRCP 41 Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice Included Court Imposed Conditions

These materials were prepared by ILC member Joseph Boufadel.


March 24, 2022

Dear constituency list members of the Insolvency Law Committee:

The following is a case update written by Joseph Boufadel, a partner at Salvato Boufadel LLP, analyzing a recent decision of interest:

SUMMARY

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit held that a bankruptcy court has the authority to impose conditions and incorporate prior factual findings in a dismissal order on a plaintiff’s voluntary motion to dismiss with prejudice an adversary proceeding under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In re Harang, 634 B.R. 731 (6th Cir. BAP 2021).

To view the published opinion, click here.

FACTS

Debtor and plaintiff Jack W. Harang filed an adversary proceeding against the Internal Revenue Service, seeking a declaration that his tax debts were dischargeable. In the course of litigation, after it answered the complaint, the IRS obtained two discovery sanctions orders, which resolved certain factual findings against the debtor. These sanctions orders foreshadowed a loss at trial for the debtor. Prior to trial, however, the debtor filed a motion to dismiss his case with prejudice under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 41(a)(2).

The bankruptcy court heard the motion, announced its decision to dismiss the case, and directed the parties to agree on the form of the order. Because the parties could not agree to the language in the proposed dismissal order, the bankruptcy court prepared its own order, imposing conditions, incorporating prior findings, and dismissing the case with prejudice.

The bankruptcy court’s order of dismissal recited the protracted history of the case and incorporated the court’s prior factual findings from the two sanctions orders, including prior findings that established the debtor’s ability but conscious refusal to pay his tax liabilities. The bankruptcy court also determined that dismissal would be with prejudice because the debtor requested such dismissal but failed to withdraw the motion, and because the government was ready to proceed with trial.

Concerned with the court imposing these conditions and incorporating prior factual determinations from the proceeding, the debtor appealed the order of dismissal—but not the two sanctions orders—to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed.

REASONING

The BAP held that the bankruptcy court has the authority to impose conditions upon dismissal under Rule 41. In particular, Rule 41(a)(2) provides in relevant part that “[e]xcept as provided in Rule 41(a)(1) [dismissal prior to filing an answer or by stipulation of the parties], an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.”  

The BAP disagreed with the debtor’s argument that the court lacked the authority to impose any conditions on the dismissal because dismissal was “with prejudice.” The IRS answered the complaint. Rule 41 expressly permits the court to set the terms and conditions of dismissal, regardless of whether it is requested with or without prejudice, where the complaint was subject to dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2). The BAP found that the text of Rule 41 is clear, and there is no distinction between imposing conditions on dismissals with or without prejudice in the text of Rule 41.

The BAP also found that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the dismissal order on “terms that the court considers proper” under Rule 41(a)(2). At the hearing on the debtor’s motion to dismiss, the court advised that it would incorporate its prior orders and findings (not new factual findings) in its order of dismissal. The debtor had several opportunities to withdraw his motion and proceed to trial but failed to do so. The debtor was afforded an opportunity to confer with his counsel off the record at the hearing but again chose not to withdraw his request. The court then provided the parties an opportunity to agree to the language in the dismissal order but entered its own order after the parties failed to reach an agreement.

The BAP dispensed with the debtor’s final argument that incorporating prior factual findings in a dismissal order is improper because of its potential res judicata effect on future litigation. The debtor confuses claim preclusion (res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). The issue preclusive effect of the dismissal order was not an issue ripe for determination because such future litigation had not commenced. The bankruptcy court did not rule on the issue preclusive effect of its order, which it left to a future court to decide. However, the voluntary dismissal with prejudice was res judicata as to the claims in the debtor’s complaint. The bankruptcy court’s incorporation of the procedural history and prior factual findings in the dismissal order—which expressed the court’s condemnation of the debtor’s misconduct in the proceeding—was proper.

AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY

I find it surprising that this opinion needed to be published. It seems obvious, almost tautological, that a bankruptcy court has the authority and discretion to address misbehavior among the parties before it and to reflect those findings in a (dismissal) order.

To rule otherwise, as the debtor advocated for, would create chaos. If correct, the debtor’s argument that no conditions may be set on a voluntary dismissal with prejudice would permit parties to avoid the consequences of their discovery abuses and bad acts, to avoid the potential of an unfavorable decision after expensive litigation, or to escape responsibility under contractual attorney’s fees provisions that would otherwise render them financially responsible.

These materials were written by ILC member Joseph Boufadel of Salvato Boufadel LLP in Los Angeles, California (Jboufadel@salvatoboufadel.com). Editorial contributions were provided by Kathleen Cashman-Kramer of Sullivan Hill Rez & Engel APLC in San Diego.

October 28, 2021: Default Interest Considerations in Bankruptcy (Webinar)


OCTOBER 28 @ 12:00 PM – 1:15 PM | REGISTER HERE

1.25 Hours MCLE; 1.25 Legal Specialization in Bankruptcy LawSpecial low price!

The panelists will discuss the timely and highly disputed issues relating to default interest in the bankruptcy context, including the following:

  • Background – default interest allowance and disallowance in the 9th Circuit, including analysis as to whether this precedent is still good law or subject to dispute (i.e., In re Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc., 850 F.2d 1338m 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 8780; GE Capital Corp. v. Future Media Prods., 547 F.3d 956, 958, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22367; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Beltway One Dev. Grp., LLC (In re Beltway One Dev. Grp., LLC), 547 B.R. 819 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 1080, and other 9th Circuit rulings);

  • California Law – how to reconcile “alternative performance” cases with penalty cases, including an analysis of Civil Code § 1671(b) and matured v. unmatured loans;

  • Loan Origination and Negotiations – Bargaining power and sophistication at loan origination and effect on default interest allowance;

  • Altadena Decisions – the effect of the District Court’s reversal in East West Bank v. Altadena Lincoln Crossing, LLC, 598 B.R. 633 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2019), including a legal analysis and practical aspects relating to this case;

  • Practical Application – the importance of handling default interest issues at the onset of Chapter 11 cases, including the effect on Plan confirmation and sub-chapter V matters;

  • Beyond Default Interest – relation of analysis to attorneys’ fees, prepayment premiums/penalties, and late charges.

Speakers: Hon. Neil Bason, Rob Goe and Gregory Salvato

Moderator: Joshua Scheer

October 21, 2021 Webinar: Litigation Funding in Bankruptcy Cases: How to Get it & Potential Pitfalls (Help Me Legalist, You’re My Only Hope)


OCTOBER 21 12:00 PM – 1:15 PM | REGISTER HERE

1.25 Hours MCLE; 1.25 Legal Specialization in Bankruptcy LawSpecial low price!

Litigation financing is being used by attorneys, bankruptcy trustees, and debtors to address the financial challenges associated with insolvency litigation & reorganizations. This program will discuss how to obtain financing along with its benefits and potential pitfalls, including:

  • The requirements necessary to obtain financing for litigation and bankruptcy proceedings from funders like
    Legalist;

  • The requirements and steps necessary to obtain Bankruptcy Court approval of post-petition financing;

  • Real world cases that involving litigation and insolvency financing to see its application in practice; and

  • Discussion of litigation and insolvency financing from the perspectives of the debtor-in-possession, bankruptcy trustee, Bankruptcy Court, and the funder.

Hon. Meredith A. Jury [Moderator]

Honorable Meredith Jury (Bankruptcy Judge, Ret.) – Judge Jury served in the Riverside Division of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California from 1997 to 2018. She was a member of the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel from 2007 to 2017, serving as Chief Judge of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel from 2015 to 2017. In retirement, she does pro bono mediations of bankruptcy cases, writes appellate briefs on consumer issues, and writes and edits the Commercial Finance Newsletter as well as assisting with the Insolvency Law Committee’s e-Bulletins.

James Hill

James P. Hill is a shareholder and founding member of the San Diego- based firm, Sullivan Hill Rez & Engel, and heads its Insolvency and Commercial Bankruptcy practice group. He practices primarily in the areas of bankruptcy, insolvency and commercial law. His bankruptcy experience includes representation of creditors, bankruptcy trustees and select bankruptcy debtors in Chapter 11 business reorganization cases. He works regularly with clients on asset sales and acquisitions, on state and federal court receivership cases, and on business workouts and dissolution matters, among other commercial law matters. Mr. Hill served two terms as the inaugural Chair of the California Lawyers Association, and previously as chair of the State Bar’s Business Law Section in 2016-2017 and as co-chair of the Insolvency Law Section of the BLS in 2012-2013. He was recognized in Best Lawyers® as the “Lawyer of the Year” in San Diego twice, and was selected in the 23rd-28th editions of Best Lawyers in America® in the fields of Bankruptcy and Creditor Debtor Rights/Insolvency and Reorganization Law as well as Commercial Litigation. He was also recognized by Super Lawyers in the field of Bankruptcy and Creditor/Debtor Rights in 2007-2021.

Gary Rudolph

Gary Rudolph is a shareholder in the firm Sullivan Hill Rez & Engel, with offices in San Diego CA and Las Vegas NV. He specializes in representing corporate and individual debtors in business bankruptcies and trustees in chapter 7 and 11 cases as well as representing fiduciaries in state and federal court proceedings. His practice also focuses on representing creditors and parties in interest in all facets of bankruptcy litigation. Another component of the services he provides is business consultation and strategic planning. He is the chair person for the San Diego County Bar Association, Bankruptcy Law Section and serves as a director on the executive board for the Business Law Section of the California Lawyers Association. His non bankruptcy activities include serving as a director on the board of Angels Foster Family Network, a non-profit organization that assists in caring for the placement young San Diego children in foster homes.

Curtis Smolar

Curtis Smolar is the General Counsel of Legalist. Previously, he was a commercial litigation partner at Fox Rothschild LLP, an Am Law 100 firm, representing clients such as Paypal, Ebay, and Bank of America. Curtis has over 20 years of litigation practice ranging from small firms to AmLaw 100 firms. As a trial lawyer, Curtis brought cases through jury trial, bench trial, and arbitration in practice areas spanning complex, commercial, bankruptcy, real estate, intellectual property, personal injury, employment, products liability and other areas of law. He holds a J.D. from Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law.

Win: Ninth Circuit BAP dismisses appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Client's $600,000+ administrative claim protected

Hou You Liang, etc. v. DiJulio Law Group, 9th Cir. BAP Appeal No. 20-1230 (April 2, 2021)

The Bankruptcy Court approved Client’s substantial administrative claim of $600,000+ over litigant’s objection. Litigant appealed approval of the administrative claim to the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. The appellate court subsequently dismissed litigant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on our motion to dismiss the appeal.

Litigant’s attack failed; Client’s substantial administrative claim was valid and protected.

Friday, November 19, 2021 - Federal Bar Association's 18th Annual Bankruptcy Ethics Symposium

November 19, 2021
Time: 9:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.
Online Webinar | Three Programs
3 Hours Ethics MCLE (CA)

Click Here to Register Online
Click Here for Flyer (PDF)

SPEAKERS

  • Honorable Sandra R. Klein, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Central District of California

  • Honorable Barry Russell, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Central District of California

  • Honorable Martin R. Barash, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Central District of California

  • John Hermann, Chief Deputy of Administration

  • Ron Maroko, Office of the United States Trustee

  • Misty Perry Isaacson, Pagter and Perry Isaacson, APLC

  • J. Scott Bovitz, Bovitz & Spitzer

  • John N. Tedford, IV, Danning, Gill, Israel & Krasnoff, LLP

  • Program Chair: Joseph Boufadel, Salvato Boufadel LLP

PROGRAMS

  1. Leaving Your Attorney Legacy: Ethical Consideration in Mentoring and Succession Planning

  2. Brave New World: Ethical and Practical Considerations in Conducting Remote Hearings and Trials

  3. Technical Competency and Ethical Pratfalls: “I am Not a Cat” and Much More

MCLE: 3.0 Hours Legal Ethics. This activity has been approved for Minimum Continuing Legal Education Credit by the State Bar of California. The FBA certifies that this activity conforms to the standards of approved education activities prescribed by the rules and regulations of the State Bar of California governing minimum continuing legal education.

Cost: $20 (FBA members); $25 (CDCBAA and LABF members); $40 (non-members); Judges and Clerks - No Charge

ILC E-Bulletin: Yoon v. Cam IX Tr., 60 Cal.App.5th 388 (2021) - Attorney's fees awarded in successful defense of tort claims under Civil Code § 1717

These materials were prepared by ILC member Joseph Boufadel.


July 6, 2021

Dear constituency list members of the Insolvency Law Committee:

The following is a case update written by Joseph Boufadel analyzing a recent decision of interest:

SUMMARY

In a lawsuit contesting the foreclosure of a borrower’s home, the California Court of Appeal held that defendants were entitled to their reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in successfully defending against the borrower’s tort claims pursuant to Civil Code § 1717. Yoon v. Cam IX Tr., 60 Cal.App.5th 388 (2021). Because borrower’s tort claims sought to avoid his obligations under a promissory note and deed of trust, by contesting both their enforcement through foreclosure and the validity of the underlying debt obligation, the borrower’s unsuccessful action was “on a contract” and the jury’s defense verdict entitled the defendants to attorney’s fees under the provisions of the documents. Defendants were also entitled to attorney’s fees for the borrower’s unjustified denial of key requests for admission in discovery pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2033.420.

To read the decision, click here.

FACTS

Plaintiff Edward Yoon (“borrower”) sued defendants CAM IX Trust and BSI Financial Services, Inc. (“defendants”) in connection with a trustee’s sale of his home. Defendant CAM IX Trust was the assignee of a deed of trust on borrower’s home that secured repayment of a promissory note, and BSI was Cam IX Trust’s loan servicer.

Borrower proceeded to trial on his claims for negligence and fraud, arguing that defendants failed to properly review his request for a short sale, and that the defendants told him the foreclosure sale date had been postponed for several days, when in fact it had not, causing him to miss the deadline for making the loan current or finalizing a short sale. In short, the borrower was seeking to avoid the underlying debt obligation and the enforcement of the promissory note and deed of trust by contesting the foreclosure process. The jury was unpersuaded and ruled in favor of the defendants.

As the prevailing party, the defendants then requested – and the trial court awarded – attorney fees and costs of approximately $220,000 on two grounds. First, pursuant to Civil Code § 1717, defendants were awarded their reasonable attorney fees and costs as provided for under the terms of the promissory note and deed of trust. Second, defendants were awarded their fees incurred in proving the truth of matters the borrower denied in response to key requests for admission from the date of the denials pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2033.420. Since those same fees were already awarded under section 1717—and there was no double recovery—no adjustment to the award was necessary.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s award.

REASONING

Attorney fees awarded under Civil Code § 1717.

Pursuant to Civil Code § 1717, in any action “on a contract” where the contract provides for attorney fees and costs, the party prevailing on the contract is entitled to its reasonable attorney fees and costs.

The borrower argued that it was improper to award attorney fees because his lawsuit did not assert breach of the contract. The borrower argued that his tort claims for negligence and fraud never mentioned or relied on the existence of a contract.

The Court of Appeal was unpersuaded and held that the whole point of the borrower’s lawsuit was to contest the validity of the obligation and the defendants’ alleged conduct in connection with enforcing the terms of the promissory note and deed of trust. A breach of contract claim is not a prerequisite for awarding attorney fees under Civil Code § 1717. Courts liberally construe the meaning of “on a contract” and so long as an action “involves a contract,” it is “on a contract” within the meaning of section 1717. Therefore, the Court of Appeal determined that the borrower’s tort claims were an action “on a contract” because they directly related to enforcement of the promissory note through foreclosure.

Turning to the relevant language in the promissory note and deed of trust, the Court of Appeal held that the attorney fee provisions in both the note and deed of trust provided for fees to the defendants as the prevailing party in the borrower’s lawsuit. The fee provision in the promissory note provided that, in the event of default, “the Note Holder will have the right to be paid back by me for all of its costs and expenses in enforcing this Note to the extent not prohibited by Applicable Law. Those expenses include, for example, reasonable attorneys’ fees.” The deed of trust contained a similar provision and provided that the lender “shall be entitled to collect all expenses incurred in pursuing the remedies provided in this [section], including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of title evidence.”

Fees awarded for unjustified denial of requests for admission.

The Court of Appeal also held that the defendants were entitled to their reasonable attorney fees and costs arising from the borrower’s unjustified denial of key requests for admission. Under Code of Civil Procedure § 2033.420, “[i]f a party fails to admit … the truth of any matter when requested to do so …, and if the party requesting that admission thereafter proves … the truth of that matter, the party requesting the admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney’s fees.”

The borrower denied several requests for admission that cut to the heart of his case, namely that defendants properly reviewed borrower’s short sale offer in good faith and in a timely manner, and that the defendants never informed the borrower that the foreclosure sale was continued.

The borrower argued that only one of the four exceptions to the award of fees under this statute applied—that he failed to make the admissions because he had reasonable grounds to believe that he would prevail in the case—justifying denial of fee award.  (The borrower did not argue that the other three exceptions applied under Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.420(b): an objection to the request for admission was sustained or a response waived, the admission was of no substantial importance, or there was a good reason for the failure to admit).

In opposing the fee request, borrower failed to explain how or why he had reasonable grounds to deny the admission requests. Borrower did not identify any evidence or circumstance to the trial court nor on appeal justifying his belief that he would prevail at trial.  Borrower’s lack of evidence or testimony justifying his belief was a fait accompli.

The borrower also argued that the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motion for nonsuit evidenced triable issues of material fact justifying a denial of the fees awarded. The Court of Appeal was unpersuaded for two reasons. First, the bases for the nonsuit were not the same issues raised in the requests for admission. Second, and importantly, the standard for evaluating a nonsuit motion does not help the borrower demonstrate that he had reasonable grounds to believe he would prevail on the merits of his case. In evaluating a nonsuit motion, the trial court cannot consider witness credibility nor weigh evidence, and the court must disregard conflicting evidence. Therefore, denial of a nonsuit motion is not proof that borrower’s case-in-chief has merit or that he will prevail.  

AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY

It appears that the only issue contested by the borrower with respect to the award of fees under Civil Code § 1717 was whether his lawsuit constituted an “action on a contract.” The borrower’s main argument was that he never alleged a breach of contract claim – an allegation that is irrelevant to the analysis.  The case law is clear that the meaning of “action on a contract” under section 1717 is to be liberally construed and has never been synonymous with breach of contract. See, e.g., Santisas v. Goodin, 17 Cal.4th 599 (1998); In re Tobacco Cases I, 193 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1601 (2011); Douglas E. Barnhart, Inc. v. CMC Fabricators, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 230 (2012).

It is also important to note that the language of the attorney fee provision matters. One lesson to be taken from this case is that if the language of the fee provision in the contract is broad enough to support a tort claim, then attorney fees and costs may be awarded to the prevailing party. But keep in mind that section 1717 is not the only provision that may support the basis for a fee request: Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1021 and 1032(b) also permit parties to agreethat the prevailing party may be awarded attorney fees incurred whether such litigation sounds in contract or tort. In many of these cases, whether attorney fees are awarded boils down to the scope and breath of the fee provision in the contract.

The case also provides a word of caution to borrowers and their counsel. Note that the Court of Appeal’s recitation of the attorney fee provisions in the promissory note and deed of trust appear to show that the fee award is a separate debt rather than an expense added to the mortgage or underlying obligation secured by the home (that would otherwise be wiped out in a nonjudicial foreclosure). As a result of losing his case, the borrower not only lost his home but was saddled with a substantial judgment.

These materials were prepared by ILC member Joseph Boufadel of Salvato Boufadel LLP in Los Angeles (Jboufadel@salvatoboufadel.com), with editorial contributions from ILC member Summer Shaw of Shaw & Hanover PC (ss@shaw.law).

ILC E-Bulletin - Aghaian v. Minassian (Cal. App. 2020) - the litigation privilege does not insulate a properly alleged fraudulent transfer claim

These materials were prepared by ILC member Joseph Boufadel.


March 8, 2021

Dear constituency list members of the Insolvency Law Committee:

The following is a case update written by Joseph Boufadel analyzing a recent decision of interest:

SUMMARY

The California Court of Appeal in Aghaian v. Minassian, 59 Cal. App. 5th 447 (2020), reversed the trial court’s sustaining of the defendants’ demurrers to causes of action for actual fraudulent transfer under California’s Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA) and aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer. In doing so, the Court of Appeal held that: (1) the litigation privilege does not insulate a properly alleged fraudulent transfer action because the focus of the action is on the transfer, not the sham dissolution proceeding and actions taken in that proceeding to provide legal cover for the transfer; (2) aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer against a guardian ad litem may proceed because the general immunity provided does not protect actions taken outside the scope of authority as a guardian ad litem; and (3) the pre-filing requirement to assert a civil conspiracy claim against an attorney is not required if the conspiracy does not stem from an attorney-client relationship and the attorney acted for personal financial gain. To read the full published decision, click here.

FACTS

The matter arises from a long running family dispute relating to transfers and dispositions of properties subject to a family trust. The dispute gave rise to two lawsuits in particular, with transactions and allegations that occurred in the first lawsuit giving rise to the second fraudulent transfer action against husband and wife Alice and Shahen Minassian and their son, attorney Arthur Minassian.

Shahen and Alice had been married and living together since the 1960s. In 2004, they purchased their residence, taking title as “Husband and Wife as Joint Tenants.” Several years later, they purchased a second home across the street, taking title in the same manner. Their son Arthur lived in the second home.

Plaintiffs are trustees and beneficiaries of a family trust established by their now deceased parents. In the first lawsuit, Plaintiffs sued Shahen based on actions he took beginning in the mid-1990s relating to the trust properties. During this lawsuit, his son Arthur applied and was appointed as his father Shahen’s guardian ad litem.

Plaintiffs alleged that Alice, Shahen and their son Arthur concocted a scheme to defraud Shahen’s creditors by putting two homes in Alice’s name only and by filing a sham marital dissolution proceeding during the first lawsuit.

The dissolution petition filed in 2016 provided that Alice and Shahen separated in 1991 — years before the transaction at issue. Notwithstanding the dissolution petition, the couple continued to live together and held themselves out as husband and wife.

In summer 2017, Alice and Arthur — as his father’s guardian ad litem — stipulated to a division of property in the dissolution proceeding. Alice received the two homes and Shahen assumed any future obligation to pay a judgment arising from first lawsuit still ongoing with the plaintiffs. The family law court approved the stipulation and entered judgment dividing the property, whereby Arthur subsequently executed and recorded quitclaim deeds to Alice of his father’s interest in the two properties.

Around this time, a six-week bench trial was held in the first lawsuit. After trial but before the court issued a statement of decision, Alice sold the second property, using the proceeds from the sale to purchase a condominium in her and Arthur’s name. Arthur, who lived in the condominium, subsequently deeded his interest in the property to his mother Alice.

In December 2018, the court entered judgment and awarded Plaintiffs more than $34 million in the first lawsuit.

Prior to judgment being entered, however, Plaintiffs commenced a second action (the underlying fraudulent transfer action) against Alice, Shahen and Arthur, alleging various claims for fraudulent transfer based on the transfers and actions taken in the first lawsuit.

The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrers as to the claim for fraudulent transfer without leave to amend. The trial court reached this decision because it held that the alleged transfer was made by Arthur as Shahen’s guardian ad litem “under supervision of the family court,” and plaintiffs could not show as a matter of law that Shahen’s transfer was made with intent to defraud. The trial court also found that Arthur enjoyed judicial immunity for his actions as guardian ad litem, and, even if his actions were a sham, they were still protected by the litigation privilege under Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b).

The Court of Appeal reversed.

REASONING

The Court of Appeal held that plaintiffs pleaded with particularity numerous badges of fraud to constitute a claim for actual fraudulent transfer, including that debtor Shahen: (a) transferred title to the two properties to insiders; (b) retained control of the two properties after the transfers; (c) was sued prior to the transfers; and (d) did not receive reasonably equivalent value for the transfers.

The Court of Appeal held that the defendants were not protected by the litigation privilege nor did the privilege insulate them from liability for a fraudulent transfer.

The Court of Appeal ruled that the act of commencing the marital dissolution proceeding and actions taken in that proceeding, the filing the petition for appointment of Arthur as Shahen’s guardian ad litem, and the agreement to a stipulated judgment as to the division of assets and liabilities did not constitute protected communications in the course of a judicial proceeding covered by the litigation privilege.

In analogizing to facts in a similar case — Chen v. Berenjian, 33 Cal. App. 5th 811 (2019) — the Court of Appeal explained that the defendants’ alleged sham dissolution proceeding and stipulated judgment to transfer properties run contrary to the purpose of the litigation privilege. With the assistance of Arthur, Shahen and Alice used the marital dissolution proceeding as legal cover to authorize Shahen’s transfer of the properties to his wife Alice. Because the gravamen of the action is the fraudulent transfer of the properties—and not the sham proceedings used to effectuate those transfers—the defendants are not protected by the litigation privilege.

The Court of Appeal also rejected the defendants’ argument that Arthur could not have aided and abetted Shahen’s fraudulent transfer of the two properties because he had immunity from the actions he took as Shahen’s guardian ad litem. Generally, a guardian ad litem is afforded immunity from liability for actions taken within the scope of the guardian’s authority, however it is not “a get-out-of-jail-free card that provides blanket quasi-judicial immunity.” Arthur’s conduct occurred outside the proper scope of his authority as a guardian ad litem and was therefore unprotected.

Finally, the Court of Appeal held that plaintiffs need not comply with the pre-filing requirements to allege a civil conspiracy against an attorney because no such claim was asserted in the first instance. But even if alleged, the pre-filing requirements were inapplicable because Arthur’s actions went beyond the performance of a professional duty to serve a client and instead involved a conspiracy to violate a legal duty in furtherance of an attorney’s financial gain.

AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY

It is easy to understand why a substantially identical fact pattern in Chensupra, 33 Cal. App. 5th 811, requires the same result here. In Chen, the debtor owed a judgment debt to the creditor. The debtor and his brother agreed that his brother would sue the debtor to obtain a judgment against him. Armed with the judgment, the brother levied on the debtor’s property to defeat creditor’s enforcement efforts against the debtor. When the creditor sued them under the UVTA, the brothers argued that the litigation privilege protected their conduct. The appellate court disagreed, holding that the levy on the property was the voidable transfer causing the injury under the UVTA — not the sham lawsuit and collusive judgment obtained by the brother. Levying on property in an effort to defeat a creditor’s valid enforcement rights under the UVTA is noncommunicative conduct unprotected by the litigation privilege. Well pleaded allegations of a fraudulent transfer under the UVTA coupled with inequitable conduct — such that the defendants used the legal system in an attempt to cleanse their purportedly voidable transfer — does not fall within the purview of the litigation privilege. To hold otherwise would provide debtors with a guide to defeat the rights of creditors and to thwart the purpose of the UVTA.

These materials were prepared by ILC member Joseph Boufadel of Salvato Boufadel LLP in Los Angeles (Jboufadel@salvatoboufadel.com), with editorial contributions from ILC member Aaron E. de Leest of Danning, Gill, Israel & Krasnoff, LLP.

Federal Bar Association's 17th Annual Bankruptcy Ethics Symposium - November 20, 2020

November 20, 2020
Time: 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m.
Online Webinar | Three Programs
3 Hours Ethics MCLE (CA)

Click here to register online
Click here for flyer and additional event information

SPEAKERS

  • Professor Nancy Rapoport, Garman Turner Gordon Professor of Law, Boyd School of Law, and Affiliate Professor of Business Law & Ethics, Lee Business School, University of Nevada, Las Vegas

  • Honorable Whitman L. Holt, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Washington

  • J. Scott Bovitz, Bovitz & Spitzer

  • Robert C. Furr, Furr and Cohen, P.A.

  • Brian Chase, Director of Digital Forensics, ArcherHall

    Program Chair: Joseph Boufadel, Salvato Law Offices

    PROGRAMS

  1. Keynote by Professor Rapoport - Telling the Story on Your Timesheets: A Fee Examiner’s Tips for Creditors’ Lawyers and Bankruptcy Estate Professionals

  2. Attorney Competence 101: The Latest Scams And Technical Dangers For Lawyers And Other Human Beings

  3. Ethical Duties and Electronically Stored Information

    MCLE: 3.0 Hours Legal Ethics. This activity has been approved for Minimum Continuing Legal Education Credit by the State Bar of California. The FBA certifies that this activity conforms to the standards of approved education activities prescribed by the rules and regulations of the State Bar of California governing minimum continuing legal education.

    Cost: $10 (FBA members); $20 (CDCBAA and LABF members); $30 (non-members); Judges and Clerks - No Charge

Speaking Engagement - Zoom CLE on July 10, 2020, “Recovering Attorney’s Fees in Bankruptcy Court Litigation”

Recovering Attorney’s Fees in Bankruptcy Court Litigation

Registration Link Here

This panel is hosted by the Remedies Section of the Los Angeles County Bar Association and co-sponsored by the Insolvency Law Committee of the Business Law Section of the California Lawyers Association.

Program Title:
Recovering Attorney’s Fees in Bankruptcy Court Litigation 

Program Date: Friday, July 10, 2020

Time:
11:00 a.m. – 12:15 p.m.

CLE Credit: 1.25 hours of General Credit

Program Description: This panel is hosted by the Remedies Section of the Los Angeles County Bar Association and co-sponsored by the Insolvency Law Committee of the Business Law Section of the California Lawyers Association.

Recent federal cases have changed the recoverability of attorney’s fees in bankruptcy proceedings under California law and the Bankruptcy Code. This program will provide an in-depth discussion of the important decisions regarding the availability of attorney’s fees in litigating issues in bankruptcy court, including contractual attorney’s fees provisions under California law, and an overview of the strategies for both creditors and debtors to pursue and recover attorney’s fees when litigating in bankruptcy court.  

Audience questions during the Zoom webinar are welcome and encouraged. We also welcome questions prior to the program, which can be sent to Joseph Boufadel at JBoufadel@salvatolawoffices.com.

Written materials will be distributed electronically prior to the program. 

Speakers: Hon. Victoria S. Kaufman, United States Bankruptcy Court, Central District of California; Daniel J. Bussel, Professor, UCLA School of Law and Partner, KTBS Law LLP; Gregory M. Salvato, Partner, Salvato Law Offices

Moderator: Joseph Boufadel, Salvato Law Offices

Price:
LACBA/CLA Member: $20
All Others: $40

Once you have completed your LACBA registration, on the date of the event you will receive a link from Zoom that will allow you to join the webinar directly.   In order to receive participatory CLE credit, registrants must participate in the webinar via Zoom.  LACBA cannot provide CLE credit to those who only listen to the program audio by phone.  Individuals wishing to receive CLE credit must register independently.

Important Information: Please log in to Zoom at least 10 minutes before the program time.You will receive a certificate of attendance via email in 7-10 business days.

ILC e-Bulletin: BAP holds that a lender’s claim is unsecured because the Debtor-borrower had no direct ownership interest in the property she purported to pledge as collateral for the related loan

These materials were prepared by ILC member Joseph Boufadel.

ILC E-Bulletin: Ninth Circuit BAP holds that a lender’s claim is unsecured because the Debtor-borrower had no direct ownership interest in the property she purported to pledge as collateral for the related loan

March 18, 2020

Dear constituency list members of the Insolvency Law Committee, the following is a recent case update:

SUMMARY

In Norio, Inc. v. Thomas H. Casey, Chapter 7 Trustee, 2019 WL 6331564 (9th Cir. BAP 2019), the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit held in an unpublished opinion that a lender’s claim was unsecured because the Debtor-borrower had no direct ownership interest in the property (membership interests in a limited liability company and a limited partnership, collectively the “Membership Interests”) she purported to pledge as collateral for the related loan. The Membership Interests were owned by a holding company which in turn was partially owned by the Debtor. In attempting to pledge the Membership Interests as collateral for a loan, Debtor mistakenly assumed that the incomplete dissolution of the company effected a transfer of the company’s assets (including the Membership Interests) to her personally, and thus, that she could pledge the Membership Interests as collateral for the loan. In affirming the bankruptcy court’s order sustaining the Chapter 7 Trustee’s objection to the lender’s claim as secured, the BAP ruled that the company remained the owner of the Membership Interests because it failed to complete the formal process for dissolution under California law — notwithstanding that the Debtor intended and believed that the company was in fact dissolved. A copy of the memorandum is available here.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Debtor and her then-husband (the “Downs”) co-owned Downs Holdings, Inc. (“Downs Holdings”) as a holding company for their investments. In turn, Downs Holdings held interests in two entities: Ten Twenty University, LLC (the “LLC”) and VPM Westchester LP (the “LP”).

After the breakdown of their marriage, the Downs adopted a unanimous shareholder resolution to dissolve Downs Holdings and to assign the non-debtor spouse with the responsibility of implementing the resolution. At the same time, Downs Holdings directed all payments due to it from the LLC and the LP to the Downs as individuals. In response, the LLC confirmed that it would direct the distributions as requested, but clarified that Downs Holdings would still remain a member of the LLC and that further documentation would be required for a formal transfer of the LLC’s interests from Down Holdings to the Downs.

After receiving the distributions, the Downs took no further action to wind up and dissolve Downs Holdings or to distribute the remainder of its assets to themselves as shareholders.

Years later, Debtor borrowed $50,000 from Norio, Inc. (“Norio”), ostensibly secured by the Membership Interests.

Three days later, Debtor filed a chapter 11 petition. Debtor’s case was ultimately converted to a chapter 7 proceeding, where Norio filed a $50,000 secured claim based upon the loan and Debtor’s pledge of her Membership Interests as collateral for the loan.

The Chapter 7 Trustee objected to Norio’s claim on the grounds that it was not secured because the Debtor could not personally pledge the Membership Interests as collateral for the loan where she did not in fact own them. In opposition, Norio argued that Downs Holdings had dissolved in 2012, causing the Membership Interests to transfer to the Downs, as shareholders, by operation of California law.

The bankruptcy court sustained the Trustee’s objection and classified Norio’s claim as unsecured. The BAP affirmed.

REASONING

The critical question before the BAP was whether Downs Holdings had transferred its assets to the Downs by formally electing to wind up and dissolve, even though it took no further steps to actually wind up the company. In holding that electing to wind up and dissolve alone is insufficient to transfer the company’s assets to its shareholders as a matter of law, the BAP provided an instructive primer on the general three-stage process of corporate dissolution in California.

In the first stage, a corporation elects to wind up and dissolve. (Cal. Corp. Code § 1900). This election to dissolve may be revoked before the corporation begins distributing its assets. (Corp. Code § 1902(a)). Among other notification provisions, when a corporation elects to dissolve, it usually files a certificate “evidencing” this election to wind up with the Secretary of State. (Corp. Code § 1901(a)). The BAP noted that these notification provisions “were enacted for the convenience of the Secretary of State and the public, and for the protection of the directors and trustees, but strict compliance therewith is not necessary.” Herschfelt v. Knowles-Raymond Granite Co., 130 Cal.App.2d 347, 351 (1955). Downs Holdings failed to file this certificate with the Secretary of State.

In the second stage, assuming the proceeding is voluntary, the corporation winds up. (Corp. Code § 1903(a)). The BAP explained that during the wind-up process, the company’s board “shall continue to act as a board and shall have full powers to wind up and settle its affairs, both before and after the filing of the certificate of dissolution.” (Corp. Code § 1903(b)). Furthermore, the company during this time shall cease to carry on business except necessary for the beneficial winding up of the company and except as the board deems necessary to preserve the goodwill and going-concern value pending a sale. (Corp. Code § 1903(c)).

In the third stage, the corporation files a certificate of dissolution with the Secretary of State once the company has been completely wound up (Corp. Code § 1905(a)). In this certificate, the directors also certify that the company’s final tax return has been filed. Thus, upon the filing of the certificate of dissolution, the company’s powers, rights and privileges cease. (Corp. Code § 1905(b)).

With this framework in mind, the BAP concluded that Downs Holdings remained the owner of the Membership Interests because the interests were never transferred to the Downs. The BAP noted that there was no dispute that the Downs unanimously voted to dissolve Downs Holdings or that the Downs intended to dissolve the corporation. Nevertheless, the BAP rejected Norio’s argument that Downs Holdings fully dissolved in 2012 as a matter of law when it elected to dissolve.

The BAP determined that Norio failed to provide any authority in support of this argument that a statement of an intent to wind up and dissolve acts as an asset transfer as a matter of law. Instead, the statutory language provides for the company’s continued existence during the wind up process while it formally divides and conveys its assets. (Corp. Code § 2010(a)). And, if a company forgets to administer or otherwise distribute assets during the wind up process, those omitted assets remain corporate assets of the dissolved company until they have been properly distributed. (Corp. Code § 2010(c)).

Ultimately, the BAP agreed with the bankruptcy court that Downs Holdings never formally dissolved because it failed both to file a final certificate of dissolution with the Secretary of State and to file its final tax return. Indeed, Downs Holdings never sought to formally transfer its assets and did not otherwise take any action to wind up its business. And, even if Downs Holdings did actually wind up and dissolve, its omission of the Membership Interests from the dissolution process meant that they remained assets of the dissolved corporation under Corp. Code section 2010(c).

Therefore, Downs Holdings remained the owner of the Membership Interests and the Debtor could not have pledged these assets as collateral for the loan, resulting in Norio having only an unsecured claim.

AUTHOR COMMENTARY

This case reminds us of the value of good checklists for the lender during the initial due diligence process. While not discussed in the opinion, it would be interesting to see what documentation and representations were made by the Debtor in securing the loan, especially since the chapter 11 petition was filed only three days after the Debtor received the funds. Was there fraud in the loan documentation or was this just sloppy vetting by the lender?

In hindsight, it appears that the lender could have avoided the loss of the secured status of its claim and the attendant litigation and appellate costs by verifying whether the corporation actually dissolved -- through the filing of a final tax return or of a final certificate of dissolution with the Secretary of State -- or by verifying that the Membership Interests were properly transferred through an assignment or other formal documentation.

This case also provides a useful primer on the general dissolution process under California law. The BAP reminds us that the statutory dissolution process requires more than simply electing and agreeing to dissolve a company. The BAP emphasized that corporate assets remain corporate assets of the dissolved company absent their actual disposition; there is no automatic transfer of assets upon dissolution as a matter of law.

These materials were prepared by ILC member Joseph Boufadel of Salvato Law Offices in Los Angeles (JBoufadel@salvatolawoffices.com), with editorial contributions from ILC member Michael W. Davis of Brutzkus Gubner in Woodland Hills (mdavis@bg.law).

ILC e-Bulletin: BAP resolves split of authority regarding “chapter 20” cases and disallows unsecured claim of lien-stripped creditor

These materials were prepared by ILC member Joseph Boufadel.

ILC E-Bulletin: ILC e-Bulletin: BAP resolves split of authority regarding “chapter 20” cases and disallows unsecured claim of lien-stripped creditor

March 6, 2020

Dear constituency list members of the Insolvency Law Committee, the following is a recent case update:

SUMMARY

In Gwendolyn Washington v. Real Time Resolution, Inc. (In re Washington), 602 B.R. 710 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2019), the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit, resolving a split of authority, held that, in a “chapter 20” case, a prior chapter 7 discharge enjoins enforcement of an unsecured claim against the debtor personally, and such claim is not resurrected even after the underlying lien has been stripped and valued at zero in a subsequent chapter 13 case. In reversing the bankruptcy court, the BAP recognized that after a lien is avoided in a chapter 13 case, the junior lienholder is generally left with an unsecured claim that must be treated as an allowed claim in the debtor’s plan; however, the Panel held that the outcome is different when a debtor previously obtained a chapter 7 discharge, thereby extinguishing its personal liability on the underlying debt, and leaving the lienholder with no allowed claim required to be paid under the plan.

To read the published decision, please click here.

FACTS

In 2012, the debtor obtained a chapter 7 discharge, extinguishing her personal liability on a debt secured by a second deed of trust on her residence. Five years later, the debtor commenced a chapter 13 case. On her bankruptcy schedules, the debtor valued her primary residence at $410,000, encumbered by a first position deed of trust for $577,070 and a second deed of trust in favor of Option One Mortgage Corporation, as serviced by Real Time Resolutions, Inc. (RTR) for $174,000.

Because RTR’s junior lien was wholly unsecured, the debtor filed a motion to avoid the junior lien on the principal residence, seeking to “strip” the lien and to value it at zero. RTR did not oppose and the bankruptcy court granted the lien avoidance motion. At the same hearing, the bankruptcy court also confirmed the debtor’s chapter 13 plan, which provided for payment of 100% of all allowed general unsecured claims.

After the debtor’s plan was confirmed, RTR filed a proof of claim, asserting a secured claim of $307,050. The debtor objected, contending that the proof of claim needed to be amended or withdrawn in light of her previous chapter 7 discharge that extinguished the debt to RTR. In response, RTR amended its proof of claim to reclassify the debt as unsecured.

The bankruptcy court overruled the debtor’s claim objection and allowed RTR’s amended unsecured claim in full. Notwithstanding the prior chapter 7 discharge, the bankruptcy court found that the plain language of Bankruptcy Code § 506(a) required that a claim based on an avoided lien be treated as an allowed unsecured claim that must be provided for in full in the chapter 13 plan. Also, the bankruptcy court determined that the language in the district’s local forms supported its conclusion because the form order granting the motion provided that “[t]he claim of the junior lienholder is to be treated as an unsecured claim and is to be paid through the plan pro rata with all other unsecured claims.”

The BAP reversed.

REASONING

The BAP began its analysis by explaining that ordinarily the anti-modification provision in Bankruptcy Code § 1322(b)(2) prohibits a chapter 13 plan from modifying the rights of holders of secured claims whose claim is secured only by a security interest in the debtor’s principal residence. However, when the lien is determined to be wholly unsecured—i.e. the interest does not attach to any equity in the residence—a debtor may avoid the lien without violating § 1322(b)(2). See Zimmer v. PSB Lending Corp. (In re Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002).

Therefore, a debtor seeking to avoid a wholly unsecured lien on her principal residence must first obtain an order valuing the lien at zero. Under Bankruptcy Code § 506(a), reducing the lien value to zero generally results in the creditor having an allowed unsecured claim for the full amount owed that must be provided for in the debtor’s chapter 13 plan in the same manner as other general unsecured claims.

However, the BAP determined that the resulting unsecured claim after a lien has been “stripped” is different if the debtor has previously obtained a chapter 7 discharge that has extinguished the underlying debt owed to the lienholder. That is, the junior lienholder does not have an allowed unsecured claim entitled to payment under the plan. In so holding, the BAP rejected a line of lower court cases—including In re Gounder, 266 B.R. 879 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2001), aff’d, 2001 WL 1688479 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2001) and In re Akram, 259 B.R. 371 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2001)—holding that a resulting unsecured claim pursuant to § 506(a) must be provided for in the debtor’s chapter 13 plan, notwithstanding the debtor’s prior chapter 7 discharge. Those cases reasoned that, in accordance with Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 418 (1992), a chapter 7 discharge only extinguishes the debtor’s personal liability and does not eliminate the liens themselves. Relying on Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991), those other cases concluded that a creditor has an allowable claim against the estate in a subsequent chapter 13 case because a chapter 7 discharge does not eliminate a lienholder’s in rem rights, which constitute a claim against the debtor’s property.

In rejecting the reasoning in Gounder, Akram, and their progeny, the BAP held that a lienholder whose lien has been valued at zero in a chapter 13 case is not entitled to an allowed unsecured claim where the underlying debt has been previously discharged, citing approvingly to a Northern District of California Bankruptcy Court decision. In re Rosa, 521 B.R. 337, 340-42 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2014). Agreeing with the analysis in Rosa, the BAP found that neither Johnson nor § 506(a) (or any other provision of the Bankruptcy Code) requires that a lienholder have an allowed unsecured claim when its lien has been valued at zero.

Importantly, the BAP highlighted the distinction between a “claim” and an “allowed claim” under § 502, noting that a claim is allowed unless it is unenforceable against the debtor or property of the debtor. As noted above, the claim is not enforceable against the debtor’s property after the lien is valued at zero under § 506(a), and the claim is not enforceable against the debtor as result of the prior chapter 7 discharge. Thus, the lienholder has no allowable claim required to be paid in the debtor’s chapter 13 plan. The BAP concluded that to hold otherwise would impermissibly resurrect a lienholder’s in personam rights where none exist against the debtor because of the previous discharge.

The BAP also noted that its holding comported with its previous decision in Free v. Malaier (In re Free), 542 B.R. 492 (9th Cir. BAP 2015) that held debts for which the debtor’s personal liability have been discharged do not count toward the unsecured debt limitation for chapter 13 eligibility under § 109(e).

The BAP also rejected the servicer’s argument that the bankruptcy court’s form avoidance motion and order governed—which provided that the unsecured portion of a bifurcated claim is allowed and must be paid as an unsecured claim under a chapter 13 plan—because local rules and forms must be consistent with the Bankruptcy Code and may not enlarge, abridge, or modify substantive rights. Sigma Micro Corp. v. Healthcentral.com (In re Healthcentral.com), 504 F.3d 775, 784 (9th Cir. 2007). Otherwise, the local forms would impermissibly abridge the debtor’s rights under § 524, which operates as an injunction against collection of a discharged debt.

AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY

Prior to Washington, bankruptcy courts in California fell on both sides of the issue. Washington provides welcome clarity and guidance on this not so uncommon fact pattern in the Ninth Circuit.

While not discussed, this result is consistent with the junior lienholder’s rights in the absence of a second bankruptcy filing by the debtor. In light of the prior discharge and the lack of any value in its lien, the junior lienholder could not enforce the debt against the debtor or its property outside of bankruptcy and should not fare better in a subsequent chapter 13 case.

These materials were prepared by ILC member Joseph Boufadel of Salvato Law Offices in Los Angeles (JBoufadel@salvatolawoffices.com), with editorial contributions from ILC member Gary M. Kaplan of Farella Braun + Martel LLP in San Francisco (GKaplan@fbm.com).

Federal Bar Association's 16th Annual Bankruptcy Ethics Symposium - November 22, 2019

November 22, 2019
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Roybal Federal Building, Conference Room 283
255 E. Temple St., Los Angeles, CA 90017

Click here to register online
Click here for flyer and additional event information

Coffee, Tea, Bagels, Pastries provided

SPEAKERS

Hon. Victoria S. Kaufman, United States Bankruptcy Court
Hon. Scott C. Clarkson, United States Bankruptcy Court
J. Scott Bovitz, Bovitz & Spitzer
M. Jonathan Hayes, Resnik Hayes Moradi LLP
Stella Havkin, Havkin & Shrago
Arthur Margolis, Margolis & Margolis LLP
Jim Selth, Weintraub & Selth APC
John Sheller, Esq.
Cathy Ta, SulmeyerKupetz APC

Program Chair: Joseph Boufadel, Salvato Law Offices

9:00 a.m. - 12:45 p.m. | Three Programs

  • Common ethical traps for bankruptcy practitioners

  • Bankruptcy Lawyer Trip Ups: Law Firm Technology; Less Than Perfect Law Firm Practices; and The Very Best of Those Gosh Darn Solicitations That Land in My In Box Every Single Morning

  • Day One: Retainers, Trust Accounts and Getting Started on the Right Foot


MCLE: 3.5 Hours Legal Ethics.
This activity has been approved for Minimum Continuing Legal Education Credit by the State Bar of California. The FBA certifies that this activity conforms to the standards of approved education activities prescribed by the rules and regulations of the State Bar of California governing minimum continuing legal education.

Cost: $25 (FBA members); $35 (CDCBAA and LABF members);
$40 (non-members). At Door $50
Judges and Clerks - No Charge